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Louisiana law controlled." Texas usury laws, therefore, are not applicable
to a contract made in Texas when it is to be performed or executed in
another state.'"

II.

REMEDIES AND DEFENSES

BETTY L. NEWCOMB HOLLOWELL
Texas law provides various remedies by way of statute, common law,
and equity for victims of usurious practices."' Contracts for usury are, by
statute, contrary to public policy, 2°° and the penalty for usury is severe.210
The policy of the legislature in regulating interest rates is essentially that
of borrower protection.' 2 In enforcing usury laws, Texas courts have generally viewed the borrower as a victim, rather than as a participant in the
transaction in pari delicto with the lender. 0' Under the pari delicto approach, the parties to a usurious contract are considered to be equally at
fault if the usurious contract was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. 0°
The courts, therefore, will leave the parties as they found them. 0 5 Under
the victim approach, on the other hand, since the contract is illegal. the
197. Id. at 189.
198. See, e.g., Connor & Walker v. Donnell, Lawsen & Co., 55 Tex. 167, 174 (1881);
Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex. 313, 319-20 (1871); Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451
S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978) (statutory
remedy applied); Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977) (common law remedy available); Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684,
688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (equitable remedy of injunction used).
200. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
201. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977). The severity of
the penalty for usury led to action by the 66th Legislature to reduce the penalty by amendment. The amendment, H.B. 616, was sent to the Governor on May 15, 1979, and is reprinted
at footnote 215 infra.
202. See Autocredit of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ dism'd); Glenn v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1939), aff'd, 155 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. 1941); Declarationof Legislative Intent,
15 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. 1-2 (Vernon 1971); cf. O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528
S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (legislature intended
to achieve its goal of borrower protection by imposing duties on creditors); Guetersloh v.
C.I.T. Corp., 451 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purpose
of usury statutes to penalize those who intentionally charge excessive interest).
203. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. 1978) (dissenting opinion); Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (1890);
Hampton v. Guaranty State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1933, no writ).
204. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890); 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 358 (1978).
205. See, e.g., Gladwin State Bank v. Dow, 180 N.W. 601, 605 (Mich. 1920); Sienkiewicz
v. Leonard Mortgage Co., 229 N.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Beach v. Guaranty
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 76 P. 16, 18 (Or. 1904).
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borrower is viewed as a victim and allowed to sue for a remedy."
Because of the illegality of usury, 07 it logically -follows that a lender
cannot sue successfully to recover usurious interest.s The underlying
agreement to pay the principal remains enforceable 9 unless the transac206. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 167-68, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890). But see Smail v. Sequoya Mobile Homes, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Smail, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319 (April 25, 1979); cf. American Century Mortgage Investors v.
Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578, 583-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(borrower precluded from asserting subterfuge of its own making to establish usury in absence
of lender's knowledge thereof). In Smail the court found that the plaintiff was in pari dilecto
with the lender under a retail installment contract that failed to disclose the proper amount
of the down payment as required by the Texas Consumer Credit Code. The down payment
was intentionally overstated by both parties in order to facilitate financing for the transaction. See Smail v. Sequoya Mobile Homes, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub non. General Elec. Credit Corp v.
Smail, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319 (April 25, 1979); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.02(6)(b)
(Vernon 1971). It is thus apparent that the approach used by the courts will depend on the
facts of the case in question.
207. See F.B. & D., Inc. v. Nathan Alterman Elec. Co., 394 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The purpose of the usury statutes is to prohibit
usury in any form. See id. at 823. Prior to the 1967 statute, article 5069, the usury statutes
expressly provided that all usurious contracts were "void as to interest." See 1915 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 28, § 13, at 50. Although the words "void as to interest" were deleted in the
enactment of article 5069-1.06, the Texas Supreme Court has recently held that the borrower's obligation to pay interest is unenforceable. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union,
533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976). The obligation is not entirely void, however, since once the
debtor has paid usurious interest, it cannot be recovered in addition to the statutory penalty.
See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978).
208. Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ). In Laid Rite the plaintiff lender, as a condition of the loan and in
consideration for making it, required the borrower to assume a note for another's debt. This
note was considered interest in determining that the loan was usurious. In a suit upon the
s~cond note, the court held that when the note was assumed as part of a usurious interest
rate, there could be no recovery on that note by the lender. Id. at 389, 392; see Wall v. East
Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976) (lender cannot recover usurious
interest to offset penalty of twice the interest rate).
Under article 5069-1.06(1) as it existed before the 1979 amendment, the lender was
required to forfeit twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged, or received, and was
prohibited from recovering any of the interest portion of the obligation. See id. at 921; Tax.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). Under the 1979 amendment, however,
the forfeiture has been reduced to "three times the usurious interest contracted for, charged
or received." See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon). The unstated
purpose of the amendment is apparently to allow for the enforcement of so much of the
interest obligation as is legal under the applicable usury ceiling, and to allow treble damages
to the debtor on the excess.
209. See Graham & Locke Invs., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 245 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The penalty statute provides for forfeiture of twice the
interest contracted for, charged, or received, but makes no mention of the effect of usury upon
the principal. See TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). Article 5071,

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss4/7

2

Newcomb Hollowell: Remedies and Defenses Student Symposium: A Study of Texas Usury L

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:825

tion involves more than twice the allowable interest rate under the applicable provision of the credit code. 10 In certain instances the creditor also may
be able to recover attorney's fees incurred in enforcing his claim.", Furthermore, although a note may provide for usurious interest before maturity,
when there is no agreement for interest after maturity the lender may
recover legal interest 2 ' on the obligation of six percent from the date due.'
the predecessor to the present penalty statute, expressly provided that "the principal sum or
value of the contract may be received and recovered." 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 205, § 28, at
550. Although the express provision for recovery of principal was deleted in the enactment of
the credit code, the courts have nevertheless continued to enforce the underlying obligation.
See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex. 1976). Also,
although the transaction involves usury, the lender may resort to foreclosure to enforce his
right to the principal. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 778, 787 (Tex. 1977);
Graham & Locke Invs., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 245-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The debtor may, however, be able to get an injunction restraining a
foreclosure pending determination of the usury issue. See notes 286-296 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of injunctions.
210. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971) (additional forfeiture
of principal when transaction involves twice allowable interest).
211. See Miles v, W.C. Roberts Lumber Co., 561 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamor, 95 S.W.2d 975,
978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ ref'd). In Miles the creditor brought suit for the
principal due on a sworn account. Article 2226 allows recovery of attorney's fees on these
claims when demand therefor remains unsatisfied after thirty days. The debtor's failure to
pay the principal, which remained a valid and enforceable debt, activated article 2226 even
though the lender had charged usurious interest on the account. Miles v. W.C. Roberts
Lumber Co., 561 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); see TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). In Hamor the court allowed recovery of attorney's fees by the defendant, who was an assignee of the principal notes only and
had no claim to the interest. See General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamor, 95 S.W.2d 975, 978
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ refd).
212. See TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
213. See, e.g., Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976);
General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamor, 95 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ
ref'd); Deming Inv. Co. v. Clark, 89 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, no writ).
In Hamor and Derning the award of legal interest on the principal was not based on the
absence of an agreement to pay interest after maturity. Rather, the courts based their opinions on reasoning that since under repealed article 5071, 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 18, § 13,
at 50, usurious contracts were "void" as to interest, there was no agreement for interest and
so the legal rate of six percent per annum could be applied to the obligation. See General
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamor, 95 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ refd);
Deming Inv. Co. v. Clark, 89 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, no writ). There
is some question whether this construction would be possible under the current statutes, since
there is no provision that usurious contracts are void regarding the interest, but only that
they shall be subject to the penalties provided. See Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02
(Vernon 1971). The supreme court in Wall cited both Hamor and Deming as authority for its
holding that in the absence of an agreement about interest after maturity, and although the
agreed rate of interest prior to maturity was usurious, a six percent rate may be implied on
the debt after maturity. See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921
(Tex. 1976). This reliance is questionable at best, since cases interpreting the statutes that
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STATUTORY REMEDIES: ARTICLE

5069-1.06

One of the most far reaching, yet surprisingly uncontroversial, usury
bills in the Sixty-sixth Legislature was House Bill 616, which amended
article 5069-1.06,111 and severely reduced the penalty for usury.'" The prewere repealed by the enactment of the credit code are of doubtful precedential value. See
Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. 1979). It is submitted that
the holding in Wall should be confined solely to the facts of that case; that is, to instances in
which there is no agreement about interest after maturity, and should not be extended to
cases in which there is an agreement for interest after maturity that is rendered unenforceable
because of its usurious nature. Any other construction would serve to defeat the purposes of
the usury statutes by awarding interest to the lender although the agreement for interest
between the parties is illegal and unenforceable. See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit
Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976).
214. See TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971). The statute sets out
remedies available to victims of usurious transactions:
(1) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than the
amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of
interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the
court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an
accidental and bona fide error.
(2) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in excess of
double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional
penalty, all principal as well as interest and all other charges and shall pay reasonable
attorney fees set by the court; provided further that any such person violating the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars. Each contract or
transaction in violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense punishable
hereunder.
(3) All such actions brought under this Article shall be brought in any court of this
State having jurisdiction thereof within four years from the date when the usurious
charge was received or collected in the county of the defendant's residence, or in the
county where the interest in excess of the amount authorized by this Subtitle has been
received or collected, or where such transaction had been entered into or where the
parties who paid the interest in excess of the amount authorized by this Subtitle
resided when such transaction occurred, or where he resides.
Id. Article 5069-1.02 provides that all usurious contracts are subject to the penalties of article
5069-1.06. See id. art. 5069-1.02. Other usury penalties for specific Consumer Credit Code
violations in subtitle 2, however, are found in article 5069-8.01 to 8.06. See TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 to 8.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). House Bill 616 amends only
section (1) of article 5069-1.06. Although the words to section (2) are unchanged, the consequence of this provision may have also been altered by this amendment. See text accompanying footnotes 263-265 infra.
215. House Bill 616 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Section 1. Subsection (1) of Article 1.06, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas,
1925 (Article 5069-1.06, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), is amended to read as follows:
(1) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than
the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor three times the
amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or received, such usurious interest
being the amount the total interest contracted for, charged or received exceeds the
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amendment article, which remains effective only for those claims pending
in litigation before the effective date of the amendment," provides for a
forfeiture of twice the entire rate of interest contracted for, charged, or
received." Under the amended article, however, the forfeiture will be
"three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or
received."2 18 By the use of the term "usurious interest," the legislature has
obviously attempted to introduce a new concept into Texas usury law: a
distinction between the legal interest on an obligation, the portion of an
interest obligation that is within the applicable interest ceiling, and
"usurious interest," or that portion of the obligation attributable to the
excess over the usury rate."' Although not expressly stated, the amendment apparently contemplates that the legal portion of the interest
charged, received, or contracted for will remain an enforceable obligation,
but the debtor is to be allowed treble damages on the "usurious interest,"
or excess.2 0 Another new provision in the usury remedy is the clause that
amount of interest allowed by law, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court
except that in no event shall the amount forfeited be less than Two Thousand Dollars
or twenty percent of the principal, whichever is the smaller sum; provided, that there
shall be no penalty for any usurious interest which results in an accidental and bona
fide error.
Section 2. This act shall be applicable to all claims of forfeiture made after the
effective date of this Act but, with respect to claims of forfeiture in litigation pending
at such effective date, the amount forfeited shall be determined under the provisions
of this subsection as originally enacted.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, §§ 1-2, at 604-05 (Vernon).
216. See id. § 2. The amendment clearly states that all claims filed after the effective
date of the act are subject to the new statute. Thus, although the transaction may have been
entered into, and usurious interest contracted for, received or collected before the effective
date of the amendment, unless a claim is filed for usury before that date then the new statute
is retroactive to encompass the pre-existing debt. Id. § 2.
217. See TEX.REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). It was the severity
of the penalty under this statute, coupled with the various uncertainties of Texas usury law
that led to moves in the 1979 legislative session to reduce the usury penalty. Twice the interest
contracted for in a long term home mortgage or other large loan generally runs into many
thousands of dollars. Moreover, the various methods of calculating interest rates, particularly
with respect to front-end charges and accelerated interest, often yield substantially different
results. See generally St. Claire, The Spreading of Interest Under the ActuarialMethod, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 753 (1979).
218. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon). The bill is reprinted
at footnote 215 supra. As originally introduced, the bill would also have deleted the provision
allowing recovery for usurious interest "contracted for." The provision was reinstated, however, by floor amendment.
219. See id. Under the statute prior to amendment, any interest exaction that pushed
the rate above the usury ceiling made the entire amount of interest usurious and subject to a
penalty of twice that amount. See TEx. Rav. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
220. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon). Under the prior
statute, the Texas Supreme Court had held that, at least as regards the entire amount of
interest, a usurious contract is unenforceable. See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union,
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reads "except that in no event shall the amount forfeited be less than Two
Thousand Dollars or twenty percent of the principal, whichever is the
smaller sum." '' The amendment retains the clauses allowing recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees, and the exception for an accidental and bona
fide error to the forfeiture provision.2
The remedy for usury is available to the debtor either as a defensive
offset to an action on a note or contract, or as an affirmative action to
recover the statutory penalty. 23 Unless the transaction involves more than
twice the applicable rate of interest,2 ' the maximum forfeiture on a usurious transaction can be awarded only once, regardless of how many parties
533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976). See notes 207 & 208 supra and accompanying text. The
courts will no doubt be called upon to determine how much of the obligation will be enforceable under the new statute. There are three possibilities. The courts could, as in Wall, refuse
to enforce the entire interest obligation, and award the debtor three times the amount the
rate exacted exceeds the applicable ceiling. See Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union,
533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976). But see Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d
217, 220 (Tex. 1979) (cases interpreting prior statutes of little value in construing new ones).
Second, the courts could enforce only so much of the interest obligation as falls within the
applicable ceiling, and then award the debtor three times the amount of the excess. This
construction would comply with the distinction, discussed above, between "legal interest"
and "usurious interest" on the same obligation. See note 219 supra. Finally, the courts could
also enforce the entire interest obligation, despite the presence of usury, and then award the
debtor his remedy of three times the amount that the applicable interest rate is exceeded.
This construction would alleviate the problem encountered in a recent case-what to do when
usurious interest has already been paid. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577
(Tex. 1978) (penalty does not include recovery of usurious interest paid). This construction
would also yield the smallest amount of recovery to the debtor, however, since he would, in
effect, receive only twice the amount of the excess. See the discussion of Miller at footnotes
246-256 infra and accompanying text. It is apparent that until interpreted by the courts, this
new amendment will inject a fair amount of uncertainty into this area of usury law.
221. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon).
222. Id.
223. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1976); Miller
v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), aff'd as modified,
563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); see Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d
71, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), aff'd as modified per curiam, 543 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. 1976). It has been stated that there is a difference between the defense of usury in an
action to recover the principal, and an affirmative action to recover usury penalties: "The
former is defensive and the latter affirmative." Employees Loan Co. v. Templeton, 109
S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no writ). Thus, although the debtor may
not collaterally attack a judgment on a note of which he was the maker on the ground that
the judgment is excessive because of usury, he may nevertheless bring a subsequent action
to recover usury penalties based on a note for which he has been adjudged liable. See Mercer
v. Bonner Loan & Inv. Co., 73 S.W.2d 988, 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934, no writ).
Further, although the four year statute of limitations on actions to recover statutory penalties
is applicable to affirmative actions based on usury, limitations do not run against the defense
of usury. See Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935).
224. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
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are liable on the transaction, or how many parties have rights of recovery."'
The supreme court has also clearly stated, in Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe &
Supply,"'6 that only one of the three statutory conditions-either contracting for, charging, or receiving usurious interest-need occur to trigger the
penalties provided in article 5069-1.06.227
A conflict of authority exists in Texas concerning whether the usury
statutes are to be strictly or liberally construed. Most courts have found
that usury statutes are penal in nature and subject to strict construction.'
This approach generally inures to the benefit of the lender since in a
questionable case the contract is construed as not usurious."' On the other
hand, some courts have noted that the legislature intended that usury
statutes should be construed liberally to accomplish the objectives of the
225. Pinemont Bank v. DuCroz, 528 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's award of
twice the interest rate to each of the claimants and allowed only the total of twice the rate to
be divided among them all. Id. at 879. But see Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577
S.W.2d 217, 221-22 (Tex. 1979). In Houston Sash the court allowed two recoveries for usury
on account of the same transaction. The primary recovery was by Bedford Corporation on an
open account upon which the plaintiff, Houston Sash, had made unauthorized interest
charges. Bedford recovered twice the amount of interest charged as well as all of the principal
of the account under subsection two of article 5069-1.06. See TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971). Heaner had executed a separate written agreement guaranteeing
all sums owed Houston Sash by Bedford. The court found that this separate contract, which
provided for an interest rate of twelve percent per annum, was sufficient to give rise to a
separate liability for usury "contracted for." See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577
S.W.2d, 217, 221-22 (Tex. 1979).
226. 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1977).
227. Id. at 261. By using the disjunctive for conditions precedent to recovery, the legislature clearly intended that only one condition is needed to set into motion the applicable
penalties. Id. at 261; see Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 788 (Tex. 1977) (on
motion for rehearing); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). At least
two courts have held that "contracting for" is sufficient to trigger statutory penalties. See
Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1976); Riverdrive Mall,
Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Invs., 515 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Two more cases found that "charging" of usurious interest invokes the penalties. See
Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l
Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). One court has
limited recovery to twice the amount "received" or actually paid. The reasoning was based
on the lack of a contract for usurious interest. See W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d
580, 584-85 (Tex. 1974).
228. E.g., First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978); Pinemont Bank
v. DuCroz, 528 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Home Say. Ass'n v. Crow, 514 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974), aff'd,
522 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1975); see Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A
Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 249 (1968).
229. See Home Sav. Ass'n v. Crow, 514 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974),
aff'd, 522 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1975). See also Stacks v. East Dallas Clinic, 409 S.W.2d 842, 84445 (Tex. 1966) (no penalty to one merely collecting for another).
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3
law. 30 Although First State Bank v. Miller, ' the latest case in this conflict, seems to settle the issue in favor of strict construction of the usury
statutes, 3 ' recovery for usurious interest is provided for by a civil
2 34
statute2 3 and is more a remedy than a penalty. It seems, therefore, that
5
strict construction conflicts not only with prior cases" and the general
3
provisions for construction of civil statutes, but also with the legislative
3
intent of protecting the borrower from abusive credit transactions. 1
Texas cases have also evidenced a lack of consistency in the determination of the amount recoverable under article 5069-1.06(1). 2" s The inconsis-

230. See, e.g., Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex. 1977) (on
motion for rehearing) (inference of broad interpretation in construing statute to be reasonable
and fulfill legislative intent); Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 544 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977) (although penal in nature,
usury statutes not to be strictly construed); O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d
856, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (liberal construction of usury
statute). See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 10, §§ 6, 8 (Vernon 1969) (section 6 requiring
courts to follow legislative intent and section 8 requiring liberal construction to attain legal
objectives and promote justice). The Texas Penal Code has been amended to state that the
rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to the code. See TEX. PEN.
CODE § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974). See generally 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 361 (1978).
231. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
232. Id. at 577.
233. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
234. See 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 361 (1978). See generally Pearce & Williams, Punitive
Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 249
(1968). The code does provide, however, that a violation of the double usury prohibition is a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to one thousand dollars. See TEX. REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
235. See, e.g., Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 769 (Tex. 1977) (on
motion for rehearing); Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth),
writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 554 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977); O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell,
528 S.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
236. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 10, §§ 6, 8 (Vernon 1969). See generally Comment, The JudicialAvoidance of Liberal Statutory Construction:Is Article 10, Section 8 Lost
and Forgotten?, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 163 (1978).
237. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 1-2 (Vernon
1971).
Much lip-service, of course, has been given to the canon that a statute which imposes
a penalty should be 'strictly' construed. Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d
893, 895 (Tex. 1962). But this canon is simply a guide to be used when resort to it
furthers the legislative purpose. The cardinal rule of construction which, significantly,
has been expressly adopted by the legislature, is that 'the court shall look diligently
for the intention of the Legislature, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil
and the 'remedy.' TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 10(6) (Vernon 1969).
O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ refd n.r.e.).
238. See 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 365 (1978). Compare First State Bank v. Miller, 563
S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978) (amount recoverable did not include refund of interest paid) and
W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. 1974) (amount recovered did not
include refund of interest paid) with Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d
918, 919-21 (Tex. 1976) (dictum) (amount recoverable should include refund of interest paid).
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tency has pertained to whether recovery of statutory penalties includes a
refund of usurious interest paid under the agreement as well as a forfeiture
of twice the usurious interest contracted for or charged."' In Wall v. East
Texas Teachers Credit Union2'4 the supreme court, in dictum, stated that
if a lender is allowed to recover usurious interest, then forfeiture of twice
the interest rate "contracted for" would be offset by that recovery, and the
actual penalty to the lender would be less than twice the interest rate.2"
But in Wall no interest had been paid, so there was no offset for the lender,
and the borrower recovered the full penalty."' In W.E. Grace Manufacturing Co. v. Levin,"' however, the lender had received usurious interest and
he was required to pay twice the interest rate, but he was not required to
return the interest received.'
The result was an offset in the lender's
favor."'
This conflict concerning statutory recovery was resolved in the recent
case of First State Bank v. Miller,246 in which the Texas Supreme Court
stated that the usury penalty in article 5069-1.06(1) does not include the
recovery of interest already paid.247 The court at the same time refused
to express an opinion on the availability of a common law action for that
recovery." ' The Miller court awarded only twice the interest contracted
for, with $14,000 of interest already paid acting as an offset in that amount
for the lender.24 The result of Miller is that a lender who has already
239. Compare Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 919-21 (Tex.
1976) (indicating that refund of interest paid proper) with First State Bank v. Miller, 563
S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978) (no refund allowed under statutory penalties).
240. 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
241. Id. at 921.
242. Id. at 919.
243. 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974).
244. Id. at 585.
245. See 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 364 (1978).
246. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978), noted in 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 357 (1978).
247. Id. at 577. The court's express holding was that the maximum recovery authorized
by section (1) of the penalty statute was twice the amount of usurious interest contracted
for, charged, or received. The holding was based on reasoning that section (2) of the same
statute expressly authorizes recovery of interest and other charges "as an additional penalty"
in cases in which double the allowable interest rate has been exacted. The court reasoned:
"If the Legislature had intended the additional penalty of forfeiture of interest paid under
Section (1), it would have been a simple matter to have so stated, as in Section (2)." Id. at
577. The majority holding on this point evoked a forceful dissent that argued that the construction of the statute would result in inequitable enforcement of the statute depending upon
whether or not the borrower had paid usurious interest. The dissent also pointed out that in
cases in which the amounts of interest contracted for, charged, or received all differ, the
standard for recovery, under the majority opinion, is uncertain. Id. at 578-80 (dissenting
opinion).
248. Id. at 577.
249. See id. at 577.
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collected usurious interest is allowed to retain that amount to offset the
penalty.2 5 Only the lender who has not collected any interest pays the full
statutory penalty without offset, and only the debtor who has paid no
interest is returned to his original position in addition to recovering the
statutory remedy.2 5' The illogical result is that of placing a lender who has
actually received usurious interest in a more favorable position than one
who has merely contracted for usury. Also, under these interpretations,
the only remedy available for recovery of usurious interest paid appears
to be a common law action in the nature of a debt.252 Fergusonv. Tanner
Development Co.751 is authority for the proposition that interest paid may
be recovered based upon common law pleadings rather than statutory
provisions. 25' Although the usury penalty was amended in 1979, the new

statute contains no reference to a refund of usurious interest paid.2 5 Miller

can be interpreted as a strict judicial construction of a very severe penalty, 55 and subsequent judicial consideration of the new, less stringent
penalty could call for a re-evaluation of the Miller case.
The second remedy, found in subsection two of article 5069-1.06, provides that when the interest contracted for, charged, or received is more
than double the applicable rate, all principal, interest, and other charges,
as well as attorney's fees, are forfeited as additional penalties."' Subsection two was interpreted in Lafferty v. A.E.M. Developers & Builders
Co., 255 in which the court held that the subsection two penalty was recover-

able in addition to the penalty recoverable under subsection one. 25 Thus,
subsection two authorizes a recovery of double the interest rate contracted
for, charged, or received, a refund of all interest paid and other charges, 2"
250. See id. at 577; Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (1977); 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 357, 361 (1978).
251. See 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 363-66 (1978).
252. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978); Ferguson v. Tanner
Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 561 S.W.2d.777 (1977); 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 363 (1978).
253. 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (1977).
254. Id. at 495. The supreme court reversed on other grounds without addressing the
issue of common law pleadings. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex.
1977).

255. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon).
256. See footnotes 201, 217 supra and accompanying text.
257. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
258. 483 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
259. Id. at 282.
260. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978). The Miller
holding that section (1) of article 5069-1.06 does not provide for recovery of interest paid was
based upon noting that section (2) expressly so provides. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.06(1), (2) (Vernon 1971). See notes 246 & 247 supra for a discussion of the Miller
case.
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and a forfeiture of all of the principal."6 ' If the debtor has made no principal
payments, that amount is forfeited and the debt discharged. On the other
hand, the amount of principal that has been paid by the debtor is refunded
to him, and the balance is discharged. 2 ' In this manner the debtor receives
the full penalty of twice the interest rate exacted, and receives or retains
the entire principal obligation.263
Although the wording of subsection two was not changed by the legislature in 1979, the amendment to subsection one of the statute will alter the
penalty provided by the former." ' This is so because the penalty recoverable under subsection two is in addition to that provided in subsection
one.265 Consequently, after the effective date of the new statute, the penalty
for exacting more than twice the allowable interest rate will be a forfeiture
of all principal, all interest and other charges, reasonable attorney's fees,
as well as three times the amount that the interest exacted exceeds the
allowable rate.2 "6
In Houston Sash and Door Co. v. Heaner2 67 the supreme court made it
clear that the penalty for "double usury" 6 ' is applicable to all of the
various interest rates authorized by subtitle one of the credit code, and to
the exceptions thereto.6 ' In the absence of an agreement to pay interest,
the maximum legal rate applicable is six percent.270 In that case, if the
creditor has charged twelve percent, he has charged twice the legal rate
applicable and is liable for the penalty provided in subsection two.27' Furthermore, if the parties are dealing on an open account without an agreement for interest, the creditor may impose no interest charges until January 1 following the date that the account was made, and may charge only
six percent per annum thereafter.272 In Houston Sash the court held that
if the creditor in this position charges any interest during the calendar year
261. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
262. See Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ);
Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1972), aff'd as modified sub nom. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.
1974).
263. See Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
264. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971); 1979 Tex. Sess. Law.
Serv., ch 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon).
265. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971). The statute is reprinted at footnote 214 supra.
266. See id.; 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604-05 (Vernon).
267. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
268. Id. at 221.
269. Id. at 220-21.
270. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
271. See Heaner v. Houston Sash & Door Co., 560 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1977), rev'd in part, 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.03, .06 (Vernon 1971).
272. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
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in which the account is made, that charge constitutes "double usury" since
no interest is allowable during that period and any charge would be in
excess of twice the legal rate. 73
COMMON LAW REMEDIES

In Texas, the existence of statutory remedies does not exclude appropriate common law remedies for usury. 74 A common law remedy appears to
be available, for instance, as a supplement to the statutory remedies since
article 5069-1.06(1), as construed, does not provide for a return of usurious
interest already paid.275 As in the case of statutory remedies, a successful
assertion of a common law remedy depends upon pleadings and proof of a
party's right thereto. 7 '
Application of Interest Payments to Principal
It is well settled that a debtor who has proven his right to usury penalties
may elect to have those penalties applied to the reduction of the outstanding balance of principal for which he remains liable. 77 If the debtor has
voluntarily paid usurious interest, 78 and part of the principal remains
unpaid, the debtor may elect to apply the interest paid to the remaining
balance of the principal. 276 It has been stated, however, that the debtor
273. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. 1979).
274. See, e.g., Irving Bank &Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injunction); Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541
S.W.2d 483, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976) (common law recovery of usury
paid), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869,
875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (cancellation of instruments).
275. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978); Bexar Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168-69, 14 S.W. 227, 227-28 (1890); Ferguson v.
Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), revd on
other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
276. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978); Burnett v.
James, 564 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex'. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd); Irving Bank & Trust
Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
277. See, e.g., Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935);
Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1976, writ ref"d n.r.e.); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, no writ).
278. See Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ); Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1969). To voluntarily pay on a usurious contract
means that the debtor did actually pay when, if he had chosen not to pay, he could not have
been compelled to do so, since usurious contracts are unenforceable with regard to the interest. See Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Gibbs, 124 Tex. 615, 621, 80 S.W.2d 742, 745 (1935).
279. Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ);
Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1969).
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may not have the benefit of both application of payments to principal and
the statutory penalties for usury for the same interest payments.280 Since
the statute of limitations runs only against affirmative actions to recovery
of usury penalties,"8 ' limitations do not run against a defense of usury,""
nor against the debtor's right to elect to have payments of usurious interest applied against the principal. 83 Thus, when all of the payments are
made within the limitations period the debtor should sue for usury penalties, and then have the full usury penalty applied against the outstanding
principal. On the other hand, when some of the interest payments fall
outside the limitations period, the debtor may elect to have those interest
payments for which recovery of 'Penalties is barred applied against the
principal, and then may recover the penalty for those payments made
within the limitations period.28 Should the interest payments, after
application to principal, be sufficient to retire the entire principal debt,
the debtor is not entitled to recover the excess interest paid. 85
280. Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935). This
statement from Adleson may be the reason that the supreme court was reluctant to acknowledge the existence of a common law action .for the recovery of usurious interest paid in Miller.
See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. 1978). In Miller the borrower
received the full statutory penalties for usury, but the dissent contended that the recovery
was not complete unless there was a refund of usurious interest paid prior to the imposition
of the statutory penalty. Id. at 578-79. The majority declined to consider the issue of granting
recovery of interest paid absent pleadings therefor. Id. at 577. Although Adleson was not cited
in Miller, it is submitted that recovery of usurious interest paid and application of those
payments to the reduction of principal are, in effect, almost idental concepts since in each
case the payments are put to the debtor's benefit. Therefore, ultimate recognition by the
courts of a common law action for recovery of usury paid in addition to the statutory remedy
would effectively overrule the statement in Adleson that a debtor may not reduce the principal and recover the penalty on account of the same payments. Compare Ferguson v. Tanner
Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976) (recognition of
common law action to recover usury paid in addition to statutory penalty), rev'd on other
grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977) with Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (debtor may not recover penalties on and reduce principal with same interest payments).
281. See TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1971) (four year statute of
limitations on actions to recover penalties).
282. See Ware v. Paxton, 266 S.W.2d 218, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954, writ rerd
n.r.e.); Smith v. Mason, 39 S.W. 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
283. See Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935).
284. See id. The debtor may also wish to apply interest payments to principal for another
reason. If he is faced with foreclosure on land that has been put up as security, he may make
such an election, and if the principal is thus discharged foreclosure would no longer be proper.
See Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
285. See, e.g., Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 876-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, no writ); Eastern Mortgage & Sec. Co. v. Collins, 118 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1938, writ rerd); Ingram v. Temple Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 306, 309-10 (Tex.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 7

1979]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

Injunctions
The existence of a remedy at law is not a ground for denying injunctive
relief "unless the legal remedy is as practical and efficient to the ends of
justice as the equitable remedy." ' Thus an injunction is available in a suit
for usury penalties to restrain the lender from collecting usurious inter1
est, 87
or to prevent foreclosure and sale under a deed of trust that secures
a usurious agreement."' The granting of an injunction is a matter of the
trial court's discretion, and will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of
discretion, or a failure to apply the law correctly to the facts. 88 If injunctive
Civ. App.-Austin 1937), aff'd sub nom. Glenn v. Ingram, 133 Tex. 431, 126 S.W.2d 951
(1939).
286. Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Long v. Castaneda, 475 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
287. See Gifford v. State, 229 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1950, no writ)
(practice of usury destroys status quo created by law that is duty of thd court to re-establish);
Stinson v. King, 83 S.W.2d 398, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ dism'd) (on motion
for rehearing) (debtor entitled to injunction restraining lender or lender's employees from
harassment by demanding payment of note).
288. See, e.g., Yonack v. Emery, 13 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgment
adopted); Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Poff v. Rollinsford Say. Bank, 105 S.W.2d 782, 783-84
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ). It is generally held that the borrower must offer to
do equity by tendering payment of the outstanding balance of the principal for which he
remains liable. He is not required to actually pay the sum over to the lender or into court,
however, but only to offer to do so. See Yonack v. Emery, 13 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, judgmt adopted) (prayer only for excess of penalties over principal sufficient offer
to do equity); Poff v. Rollinsford Say. Bank, 105 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ) (tender of legally due principal in pleading sufficient offer).
289. Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp.,
544 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (record must only show
probable right to recovery and probable injury should injunction not be granted to support
judge's exercise of discretion). A court of civil appeals also may issue a temporary injunction
to protect its jurisdiction on an appeal from a denial of an injunction by the trial court. See
Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Ex parte Hughes the supreme court held that usury laws
create only private rights, and that since there were no constitutional 'orstatutory provisions
authorizing the state to enjoin usury, nor declaring it to be a nuisance, the state had no
standing to seek an injunction. See Ex parte Hughes, 129 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. 1939). The
Consumer Credit Code now provides that the Consumer Credit Commissioner may seek to
enjoin violations of the consumer provisions of the code. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-2.03(7) (Vernon 1971). It is arguable that the chapter one provision that "contracts for
usury are contrary to public policy," would satisfy the requirements laid out in Hughes that
there be some injury to the public at large, and that the state may now properly bring actions

to enjoin usury under chapter one. See Ex parte Hughes, 129 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. 1939);
Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
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relief is denied, the debtor is left with the remedy of a suit for statutory
penalties.9 9 In cases in which real property is concerned, the existence of
a cause of action for damages at law should not exclude equitable relief.2 '
When a substantial claim of usury is asserted, as in Irving Bank & Trust
Co. v. Second Land Corp., 92 the trial judge may preserve the status quo
by injunction until the net indebtedness is ascertained at trial.2913 The
Irving court held that the value of the land need not be proven to show
irreparable injury, but that one need only show that denial of an injunction
is likely to cause substantial losses that would not be remedied by money
damages or statutory penalties.294 In Irving the borrowers sought to enjoin
the lender from sale of the borrower's land that was subject to unpaid
notes."9 5 The Sorrowers showed that if the land were to be sold, their partnership business of sand and gravel mining would be interrupted and their
equity and source of materials would be lost - the losses of which could
not be compensated for by usury penalties or money damages. 9 1
DEFENSES

In any claim of usury, four elements must be shown:" 7 a loan or agree290. See Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.). In Riverdrive Mall the court of civil appeals
determined that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying an injunction to
prevent a forclosure sale. Although the court recognized that the plaintiffs had a colorable
claim of usury and had offered to do equity by their petition, it nevertheless held that the
court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the plaintiff was actually
financially unable to tender payment of the principal to the defendant, and that construction
of the mall had been delayed for several months, and would be further delayed by the granting
of an injunction. Id. at 9.
291. See Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. 544 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
293. Id. at 688. The court noted that the penalties for usury, when applied against the
principal, could retire the indebtedness and thus prevent the foreclosure sought to be enjoined. Id. at 688. In that case, an injunction would appear to be a more practical remedy
since a foreclosure and sale upon property securing a usurious, but delinquent note, is not a
nullity. See Graham & Locke Invs., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 245-46 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.). Furthermore, it has been noted that failure to pay
usurious interest is not a default authorizing acceleration of maturity and foreclosure since
an agreement to pay usury is illegal and unenforceable. See Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co.,
541 S.W.2d 483, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
294. See Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
295. Id. at 686.
296. Id. at 688.
297. Maxwell v. Estate of Bankston, 433 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1968, no writ); Campbell v. Osky, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1922, no writ).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 7

19791

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

ment to lend; 9 8 an agreement to repay the principal absolutely;2"" the
exaction of a greater rate of interest than legally allowed for use of the
loan; 0 and the intent to violate the usury laws.310 Since the presence of
each of these elements is essential to establish usury, the absence of any
of the four elements defeats the claim of usury. 02 Other possible defenses
include mistake or error, estoppel, disclaimers and savings clauses, purging, and the statute of limitations.
Mistake or Accidental and Bona Fide Error
No penalty for usury is imposed under article 5069-1.06 when the violation results from an accidental and bona fide error,130 but few Texas courts
have been willing to find such errors. In Guetersloh v. C.I.T. Corp."" the
court found that the lender intended the interest to be at a non-usurious
rate and that the illegal rate actually charged was caused by an honest
mistake in calculation."' It was held that the Guetersloh trial court cor3
rectly reformed the note to comply with the parties' intended bargain. "
In other cases, the courts have been reluctant to find mistake or bona
fide error.0 7 A lender will not be allowed to reform a note that is usurious
298. See Maxwell v. Estate of Bankston, 433 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1968, no writ); Campbell v. Osky, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1922, no writ).
299. See Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref d).
300. See id. at 456.
301. Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977),
aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978) (intent is intent to make bargain made, not
intent to commit usury); Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 492 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976) (subjective intent immaterial), rev'd on other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
302. See Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1936, writ refd); Campbell v. Osky, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1922, no writ).
303. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
304. 451 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
305. Id. at 761. Not only was there an error in calculation, but the intent to exact usury
was also absent. See id. at 761. Another recent case involving accidental and bona fide error
was Page v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 548 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977,
no writ).
306. Guetersloh v. C.I.T. Corp., 451 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Dewey v. American Nat'l Bank, 382 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
307. See, e.g., O.R. Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Bell, 528 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (printer's error not bona fide error of defendant);
Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (failure of attorney
to advise not accidental and bona fide error); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (if intent existed to make the bargain made,
then not error).
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on its face without first establishing mutual or unilateral mistake by pleading and proof. 08 When a note is usurious on its face, there can be no
implication that the usurious interest was the result of a bona fide error
without evidence that an actual error was made."'0 Unless there is evidence
that either party was misled or was ignorant of the terms of the note, a
mistake theory is not a good defense to a charge of usury."" When a lender
receives usurious interest in an honest but mistaken belief about the particular circumstances of the loan transaction, he may use mistake as a
successful defense. 1 ' Ignorance of the law, however, is not bona fide error
within the statute."' Thus, while the general rule prevails that ignorance
of the law is no defense, ignorance of the terms of a usurious agreement
may be an acceptable defense. 3
Another situation, closely analogous to that of mistake arises when the
interest exacted, though above the legal rate, is so minimally above the
rate that the existence of usury is negated." When the usury exacted is
trivial, the courts generally apply the doctrine of de minimis non curat
308. See Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d
724, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974).
309. Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1976).
310. See Freeman v. Hernandez, 521 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no
writ).
311. Comment, Lender Participationin Borrower's Venture: A Scheme to Receive Usurious Interest, 8 Hous. L. REv. 546, 566 (1971); see Bank of United States v. Waggoner, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 378, 399 (1835) (neither party intending usury, law will not infer it); Abilene
Christian College v. Wright, 1 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, writ ref'd)
(lender mistaken or misled in believing contract not usurious, thus no intent and no usury).
312. See Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ)
(consulting attorney no relief to taint of usury); Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974,. no writ) (ignorance of usury laws no excuse for
intentional usurious bargain).
313. Compare Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ)
(ignorance of law no excuse) and Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (no excuse for ignorance of law) with Freeman v.
Hernandez, 521 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ) (indicating that if
ignorant about terms of note or misled, then mistake good defense) and Southwestern Inv.
Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo) (must establish mutual or unilateral mistake by proof and pleading for valid defense of'
mistake), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974) and Abilene Christian
College v. Wright, 1 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, writ ref'd) (lender misled
about meaning of terms of contract).
314. See Peightal v. Cotton States Bldg. Co., 61 S.W. 428, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no
writ).
Where the amount of interest taken above the legal rate is trivial, the maximum "De
minimis non curat lex," is applicable. The taking of an insignificant amount would
have a tendency rather to disprove than to prove usury; for any one intending to take
more profit upon a loan of money than the law would hardly be content with an
exceedingly small amount. Webb, Usury, §210.
Id. at 432.
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lex.11 Under this doctrine, the excess interest is simply disregarded.",
Estoppel
31' 7
Although estoppel is not usually an effective defense in usury cases, it
may be effective with evidence of deceitful conduct."' In American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd.31 the borrower concealed
from the lender the fact that the loan was made for the benefit of a partnership and not a corporation.2 0 The borrower was estopped from asserting
the subterfuge to establish usury unless he could show that the lender had
knowledge of or acted in the subterfuge. 2'

Disclaimers and Savings Clauses
Although men are generally presumed to have the intent to obey the law
unless the contrary is shown, 322 lenders may nevertheless attempt to protect themselves from usury charges by adding disclaimers and savings
clauses to their contracts. 32 Disclaimers state that the lender lacks the
requisite intent to charge usurious rates. 334 A mere disclaimer will not
315. "The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters."

BLACK'S

LAW DICTMONARY 482 (4th ed. 1951); see Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546

S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ); Miller v. Gibraltar Say. & Bldg.
Ass'n, 132 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).
316. Thornhill v. Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) (forty-two cents overcharge). See also Morris v. Jordan
Financial Corp., 564 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ); Anguiano v. Jim
Walter Homes, Inc,, 561 S.W.2d 249, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
317. See Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Western Guaranty Loan Co. v. Dean,
309 S.W.2d 857, 863 (Tex. Civ..App.-Dallas 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
318. See Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). The five elements of equitable estoppel
are (1) misrepresentation or concealment of facts, (2) made with knowledge of the true facts,
(3) to one ignorant of the truth, (4) with the intent that the innocent party should act on it,
(5) and the innocent party must, in fact, act upon it. Id. at 101.
319. 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
320. Id. at 583.
321. Id. at 583-85. In O'Quinn v. Beanland the borrower successfully avoided an obligation on a note on the ground of mental. incompetency, thus losing his right to assert usury.
O'Quinn v. Beanland, 540 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
322. Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977),
aff'd as modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); see Hernandez v. United States Fin. Co., 441
S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ dism'd).
323. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050 (1937).
324. See id. at 198, 102 S.W.2d at 1050. The following are two examples of savings clauses
found in notes for loans.
Short form savings clause:
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relieve a usurious contract of usury,2 5 but a savings clause, in conjunction
with a disclaimer can avoid usury. 26 Savings clauses, an example of which
is a clause allowing the "spreading" of interest over the entire term of the
loan, may protect a lender from a charge of usury.327 Generally, a lender
cannot write a usurious contract and then relieve himself of usury penalties
by a clause disclaiming the intent "to do that which he had already
'
done."328
If there is a savings clause providing that an otherwise usurious
interest rate is to be spread over the entire term of the loan, usury may be
avoided."'
The loan evidenced by this note has been made on the assumption that all scheduled
payments will be made when due and in the event of accelerated maturity from any
cause any interest paid on account of this loan in excess of the maximum lawful rate
to the time of such maturity shall be considered for all purposes as payment of principal.
Long form savings clause [in pertinent part]:
This instrument shall be construed under the laws of the State of Texas, and the
obligation of maker to make payments of additional interest as provided for in this note
is expressly limited so that the aggregate amount of all the interest due and payable
by maker on this note during any period of twelve (12) calendar months shall never
exceed the highest rate allowed by the usury laws of the State of Texas as construed
by courts having jurisdiction thereof; and if, at the time any such payment of additional interest is due and payable, the payment of such sum would make the total
interest due and payable during the twelve (12) calendar month period ending upon
such due date exceed the highest rate allowed by such usury laws as construed by
courts having jurisdiction thereof, the amount so payable by maker shall be reduced
to an amount which, together with all other interest due and payable during that
period as provided for in this note, together with any other amount or charges allocable
to such period which maker may become obligated to pay under this note, the deed of'
trust or other security instruments, or otherwise, in connection with the borrowing
evidenced hereby, which might be construed or deemed to constitute 'interest,' does
not exceed interest at the highest rate permitted by the usury laws of the State of
Texas, all as construed by the courts having jurisdiction thereof, and, further, any
payment made of additional interest in excess of such highest rate permitted by the
usury laws of the State of Texas shall be considered as a mistake and the excess thereof
over such highest rate shall be returned.
See STATE BAR OF TEXAS, LEGAL FORM MANUAL FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, Deed of Trust,
§ 7, at 7B (1976).
325. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050 (1937); Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
326. See Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343-45
(5th Cir. 1972); Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71, 81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), aff'd as modified, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976).
327. See Commerce Sav. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539
S.W.2d 71, 81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), aff'd as modified, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976). For a more
complete explanation of "spreading," see generally St. Claire, The Spreading of Interest
Under the Actuarial Method, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753 (1979).
328. Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
329. See Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343-
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Purging Usury by Compromise and Settlement, Release, Novation or
Renewal
Simple renewal of an originally usurious contract cannot remove the
taint of usury. 3 0 The new note must be a novation or settlement of the old
note by the parties supported by new consideration in order to purge the
contract of usury.3 3 ' Whether a new note is a novatibn or merely a renewal
is a question of fact. 332 By abandoning the old debt and creating a new valid
one in a compromise and settlement, the contract may be purged of
usury. 33 3 A release in a compromise and settlement agreement may be
ineffective in eliminating usury, however, if the usurious charges are carried forward into the new agreement.3 4 Care should be taken to ascertain
that the contract has been purged of usury. If charges are carried forward,
33
new consideration should be clearly specified.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

Under article 5069-1.06 of Texas Credit Code, a cause of action for usury
arises when interest greater than the amount authorized is contracted for,
charged, or received. 3 All usury actions, however, must be brought within
45 (5th Cir. 1972) (spreading of front end interest by savings clause over term of loan prevented charge of usury); Commerce Say. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71, 81
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]) (spreading by savings clause allowed to prevent
usury), aff'd as modified, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976). See also Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson,
561 S.W.2d 777, 786-87 (Tex. 1977) (on motion for rehearing). When the debtor had full use
of the consideration in the form of real property, although one year's interest exceeded the
legal rates, that amount may be spread avoiding usury. Id. at 786-87.
330. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 89-90, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940).
A unilateral election by the lender to treat interest paid as return of principal and to reduce
interest to a legal amount to avoid usury penalties is not a permissible method of purging
usurious contracts. Hurley v. National Bank of Commerce, 529 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Moreover, a usurious loan made under prior law cannot
be purged of usury by subsequent renewals and extensions to come within the new statute
and escape usury charge. See Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc. v. Southwestern Inv.
Co., 476 S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), on remand, 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974).
331. Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 90, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940); see
Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
332. Wallace v. D.H. Scott & Son, 133 Tex. 293, 299, 127 S.W.2d 447, 450 (1939); Cherry
v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); see Commerce
Trust Co. v. Ramp,. 135 Tex. 84, 90, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940). The Ramp court stated
that novation is the purging of an executory contract, in contrast to the release of liability
for interest paid. Id. at 90, 138 S.W.2d at 534.
333. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 136,
137 (Tex. 1974); Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 90, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940).
334. Skeen v. Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516, 521-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
335. See id. at 521-22.
336. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1971).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss4/7

20

Newcomb Hollowell: Remedies and Defenses Student Symposium: A Study of Texas Usury L

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:825

four years of the date the usurious charge was received or collected."' No
mention is made in the statute of the time the usurious interest was contracted for." 8 The date of contracting, therefore, has no bearing upon the
limitations period.3 9 An action for debt was brought by the plaintiff in Joy
v. Fidelity Finance Co. 40 to recover as penalties double the amount of
usurious interest collected by the defendant on three notes totaling $800.
The defendant, among other defenses, pled that the then current two year
statute of limitations had run on a portion of the cause of action.3 1 ' The
court of civil appeals agreed that the statute of limitations began to run
on the date the usurious interest was paid, and barred the plaintiff's cause
of action on six interest installments of $12 each on which the period of
limitations had run. 32 A new period of limitations begins running with

each usurious interest payment since receipt of each constitutes a matured
cause of action; affirmative action, if taken at all, must be asserted before
the limitation period expires. 43 The law will not create a new contract and
337. See id. § 3. It should be pointed out that for transactions under subchapter two of
the credit code a different statute limits the time within which actions must be brought.
Regulated loans, installment loans, retail installment sales, secondary mortgage loans and
motor vehicle installment sales all are within the purview of article 5069-8.04, providing for
a two and a four year statute of limitation, depending upon the circumstance. See id. art.
5069-8.04 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). See also Schmid v, City Nat'l Bank, 132 Tex. 115, 119,
114 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1938); Rest Haven Cemetery v. Swilley, 127 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Noble v. First State Bank, 69 S.W.2d 1114,
1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, writ dism'd); Hampton v. Guaranty State Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, no writ); Joy v. Fidelity Fin.
Co., 60 S.W.2d 1041, 1041 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no writ); Russ v. Motor Fin. Co.,
55 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ).
338. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06, § 3 (Vernon 1971).
339. See id. Thus, the limitations period may run far beyond four years from the date of
contracting. For example, if the contract is entered into in 1970, under article 5069-1.06(1)
or (2), a cause of action for usury exists at that time. If the first payment of interest is received
in 1971, the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. With each collection or receipt
of usurious interest, the statute of limitations begins regarding that payment. Thus, if the
last payment of interest is made in 1978, the last date for a cause of action within the
limitations period is 1982. This is twelve years from the time of contract in 1970. See Hurley
v. National Bank of Commerce, 529 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ rev'd
n.r.e.) (limitations period runs on each payment from time made). See also Adleson v. B.F.
Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 941 (1935); United Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Farr,
359 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ); Ware v. Paxton, 352 S.W.2d 520,
522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961), aff'd in part, ref'd in part, 359 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1962).
340. 60 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no writ).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1041-42.
343. See Hampton v. Guaranty State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1933, no writ) (appellant's theory that cause of action accrued not on payment of interest but on payment of entire debt rejected by court); Russ v. Motor Fin. Co., 55
S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ) (amended pleading not substantially
different from former pleading, therefore, cause not barred by statute of limitiations).
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extend the limitations period "for the sole purpose of creating a right to a
penalty suit" for usury.3" '
The cause of action for the statutory penalty for usury arises when usurious interest is paid in advance, and not when the entire principal and
interest are liquidated. 45 It was pointed out in Noble v. FirstState Bank'
that the date of payment of usurious interest is not so simply ascertained.
There was an exchange, in Noble, of a check, a deposit slip, and a note at
the time the loan was made. The dissenting judge would have held that
"when all matters of form and simulated transactions are brushed aside,"
37
the usurious interest was not paid until just before maturity of the note .
Under this interpretation, the dissent contended that the borrower's claim
should not have been barred by the statute of limitations.348 Noble illustrated first, that ascertainment of the date of payment on which the statute of limitations begins to run is often unclear and complicated. Second,
it demonstrates that the attorney should consider all possible dates upon
which the statute of limitations could have begun in order to prevent being
barred from asserting a valid claim of usury.
When usury is pled as a defense to a contract sued upon, it is not an
affirmative action to recover the statutory penalties and, therefore, the
statute of limitations does not apply.34 This rule, however, holds true only
when the defendant's answer claims usury as the only defense. 3560 In
Commerce Savings Ass'n v. GGE Management Co.Y' the defendants filed
verified answers in an action to recover on a promissory note, alleging the
transaction to be usurious. Besides alleging usury as a defense, they affirmatively prayed for relief, counterclaiming for penalty interest, attorney's
fees, and exemplary damages.35 ' Since the defendant asserted affirmative
claims along with the defense of usury, the four year statute of limitations
3 53
was held to apply.
344. Hampton v. Guaranty State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1933, no writ).
345. See Schmid v. City Nat'l Bank, 94 S.W.2d 554, 555-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth, 1936), aff'd, 132 Tex. 115, 114 S.W.2d 854 (1938) (lender's demand that borrower pay
$3000, or ten percent before maturity held usurious).
346. 69 S.W.2d 1114, 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, writ dism'd) (dissenting
opinion).
347. Id. at 1115.
348. Id. at 1115; see Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 568, 80 S.W.2d 939, 94042 (1935); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
349. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168-69, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890); Smith v. Mason, 39 S.W. 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
350. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 168-69, 14 S.W. 227, 228
(1890); Smith v. Mason, 39 S.W. 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
351. 539 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.]), modified, 543 S.W.2d
862 (Tex. 1976).
352. Id. at 75.
353. Id. at 76.
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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PARTIES

A third party's rights or liabilities regarding usury claims or defenses are
determined by his relationship to the parties directly involved in the transaction alleged to be usurious.3 ' Since article 5069-1.06 provides that penalties for usury shall be forfeited "to the obligor," 35 the courts have limited
its applicability to the "immediate parties" to the transaction.3 5 6 Thus, in

Houston Sash and Door Co. v. Heaner47 the supreme court held that an
individual guarantor of a corporate debt could not interpose the usury
defense to which the corporation was entitled.31 Although an earlier civil
appeals case had held that "[a] surety or guarantor can assert any defense

to a suit on a note available to the principal, '359 Houston Sash represents
a unique case.3 0 In Houston Sash the guarantor had signed a written
guaranty agreement that provided for interest, while the underlying obligation was an open account with no agreement for interest.36 Although the
usurious nature of the underlying agreement called for a forfeiture of principal as well as penalties for usury, the guarantor had waived any requirement of a judgment on the open account before enforcement of his guaranty. 32 He remained liable on his guaranty, and could not set up the
defense of usury available on the underlying transaction that arose because
of the absence of an agreement for interest, since his written guaranty
agreement did provide for interest.33
A third party is thus obliged to show that his right to question a usurious
contract is derived from the rights of a party to the contract.36 "Successors,
354. See, e.g., Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880,
884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no writ) (liabilities); Gubitosi v. Buddy
Schoellkopf Prod., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ) (liabilities); Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rights); Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d 107, 110
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rights).
355. See TEx. Rxv. Civ. STA'r. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
356. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979); Micrea,
Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
357. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
358. Id. at 222.
359. Stephens v. First Bank & Trust, 540 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
writ refd n.r.e.).
360. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979).
361. See id. at 218-19.
362. See id. at 221-22.
363. See id. at 221-22. It is questionable whether the court's conclusion would have been
the same had the guarantee agreement not provided for interest. In that case, it would seem
that the creditor would have made the same usurious demands against the guarantor as
against the primary obligor. See id. at 221-22; Stephens v. First Bank & Trust, 540 S.W.2d
572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
364. See Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ.
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guarantors, assignees or anyone" on behalf of a corporation are prohibited
by article 1302-2.09 from the claim or defense of usury unless the corporation has the right.3 5 The term "guarantor" in article 1302-2.09 extends to
guarantors of all kinds."' For example, the president of a corporation, as
corporate guarantor, cannot assert the defense of usury unless the corporation could do so.3"7 An individual guarantor of a corporate loan does not
have a claim of usury under article 1302-2.09, even though he is primarily
liable on the loan."'8 To sue successfully on a claim of usury on a corporate
loan, an individual must sue as a comaker with control over the corporate
3
borrower. 11
A guarantor or surety may be sued independently and separately on a
debt and cannot assert usury when the party or corporation accommodated
could not do so.110 A guarantor's liability on a debt is determined by the
principal's liability, unless expressly limited or extended by agreement.3 7'
An agreement limiting the guarantor's liability to the remaining balance
of the principal limits the guarantor's liability to that remainder plus the
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In a 1977 case, a bank, as assignee of a note by the
maker, paid the payee allegedly usurious interest on behalf of the maker. Since no interest
was paid on the bank's behalf, no cause of action accrued to it; the cause of action accrued
to the maker of the note. See Izaks v. National Bank of Commerce, 547 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); cf. Stephens v. First Bank & Trust, 540 S.W.2d 572, 574
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (surety or guarantor can assert any defense
available to principal party in suit on note).
365. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978); Dorsaneo,
Creditors Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 213, 233 (1977).
366. Hutchinson v. Commercial Trading Co., 427 F. Supp. 662, 667 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
see Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. 1976).
367. See Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d 420,
425-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dorsaneo, Creditors Rights, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 213, 234 (1977).
368. VIP Commercial Contractors v. Alkas, 553 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, no writ); see TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 19631978). Normally, loans involving individuals are limited to a ten percent maximum interest
rate. See id. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
369. See Sud v. Morris, 492 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no
writ); Dorsaneo, Creditors Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 213, 233-34
(1977).
370. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Commercial Trading Co., 427 F. Supp. 662, 667 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Universal Metals & Machr, Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. 1976); Loomis
Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A guaranty agreement may waive the legal requirement
that a lender must first exhaust his rights against the maker of a note. Hartnett v. Adams &
Holmes Mortgage Co., 539 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
371. Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prod., Inc.,
545 S.W.2d 528, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
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interest on the balance. 72 When the guarantor's agreement with the borrower does not indicate at what point a guarantor's liability arises, then
the filing of the suit by the lender will operate as a demand on the guarantor.373 Guarantors, however, are not necessary parties to a suit for recovery
374
of amounts owed even though it is alleged they paid part of the interest.
In considering liabilities of third parties from the lender's view point, it is
important to remember that assignees of lenders are charged with knowledge of the usurious nature of the contract and are liable for the statutory
37
penalties. 5
EXCEPTIONS TO THE USURY STATUTES

Corporations
In Texas, corporations are not governed by the maximum interest rate
of ten percent. 76 With certain exceptions "as otherwise fixed by law,"
article 5069-1.02 sets the maximum legal rate of interest at ten percent and
provides that all usurious contracts are against public policy and are subject to the penalties in article 5069-1.06 . 77 One exception "otherwise fixed
by law" is article 1302-2.09, which sets the maximum borrowing rate for
corporations at one and one-half percent per month for loans over $5000.31
Although article 1302-2.09 is not in the same subtitle as article 5069-1.06,
the court in Texas Tool Traders v. WE. Grace ManufacturingCo.37" held
that the legislature intended that the penalties in article 5069-1.06 apply
372. Commerce Say. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71, 77 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.]) (limitation of liability also negated claim of usury), modified
and aff'd per curiam, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976).
373. See Hargis v. Radio Corp. of America, 539 S.W.2d 230, 232-33 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
374. Sud v. Morris, 492 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
375. See North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Warren, 451 S.W.2d 921, 925-26 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
376. See Sud v. Morris, 492 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
Compare Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978) (corporate rate)
with id. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971) (general interest rate).
377. Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972), modified and aff'd sub nom., W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d
580 (Tex. 1974); see Tax. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02, .06 (Vernon 1971); cf. id. art.
5069-8.01 to 8.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (providing penalties for usurious violations of
subtitle 2, article 5069, consumer credit section of code).
378. See TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978). An eighteen
percent annual interest rate has been discussed as equivalent to a one and one-half percent
per month rate without regard to computation methods. See Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life
Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
379. 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), modified and aff'd sub nom. W.E.
Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974).
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to all transactions exceeding the maximum legal rate of interest whether
under article 5069 or article 1302.380
Avoidance of the ten percent maximum legal interest rate for loans can
be achieved by incorporation. Lenders may validly require borrowers to
incorporate prior to entering into a loan agreement.31 In Skeen v. Glenn
Justice Mortgage Co.M3 the court held that a loan contract was not void or
illegal even though the borrowing corporation was formed solely to qualify
for the loan.3 13 Moreover, in American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd.3"' the court noted that incorporation was demanded to
comply with the usury laws, not to evade them. 315 It could be argued, of
course, that while complying with the law allowing corporations to borrow
at one and one-half percent per month intersest rates, the intent of forced
incorporation is to avoid the ten percent per annum ceiling for noncorporate loans. Regardless of the logic in this argument, the courts in
3
Skeen and American Century refused to recognize it. 11
Texas has yet to deal adequately with two problems raised by forced
incorporation. The first problem was pointed out in Hutchinson v. Commercial Trading Co., u7 in which the court hypothesized a circumstance in
which an inexperienced borrower was forced to incorporate for a "personal
and necessitous" loan by a lender in a superior bargaining position.' The
Hutchinson court concluded that this loan probably would be found to be
usurious in Texas." ' To date, this conclusion has not been tested. The
second problem involves the tax consequences of forming corporations
solely for the purpose of borrowing. 310 When a corporation carries on a
380. Id. at 502.
381. See Hutchinson v. Commercial Trading Co., 427 F. Supp. 662, 666 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 576 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
382. 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
383. Id. at 256; see Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d
880, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, no writ).
384. 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
385. Id. at 582.
386. See id. at 582; Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
387. 427 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
388. Id. at 666; see Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32
Sw. L.J. 27, 80 (1978); 29 Sw. L.J. 959, 963-64 (1975).
389. Hutchinson v. Commercial Trading Co., 427 F. Supp. 662, 666 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
see 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconefsky, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 240
N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 198 N.E.2d 907, 249 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1964) (disregarded
corporate exception to usury laws when individual incorporated for personal loan and lender
had knowledge of this fact); 29 Sw. L.J. 959, 963-64 (1975) (Texas courts likely to find usury
for public policy reasons when corporate loans for personal use).
390. See generally Comment, Using a Dummy Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and
Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437, 451-52 (1974).
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business activity, such as borrowing, it cannot be considered a passive nontaxable entity.39 ' Incorporation for borrowing purposes generally entails a
greater taxation burden on the borrower. 2 Although extensive analysis of
tax or other consequences of incorporation is beyond the scope of this
paper, in looking to the corporate exception for borrowing relief, both the
borrower and the lender should be aware of at least two possible problem
areas - the tax consequences and the purpose for which the loan is
3
made .A
Real Property Improvement

A 1975 addition to article 5069-1.07 provides that certain real estate
loans of $500,000 or more are to have the same maximum interest rates as
corporate loans.3 9' Although the courts have not yet construed this subsection, several questions might be raised. It is unclear whether the reference

to construction loans in 5069-1.07(b) means that the entire amount must

be spent on land acquisition.3 91 To avoid a possible conflict with the stat-

ute, two separate loan transactions, one for construction and one for land
acquisition, could be made; or perhaps the loan contract could specifically
apportion the costs.9 Another question concerns the definition to be given
"improved real property" as used in article 5069-1.07. Regulation 8.1A of

the Texas Savings and Loan Commission defines "improved real estate"
as (1) land where there is a permanent building, (2) land or site ready for
391. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971).
392. See generally Comment, Using a Dummy Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and
Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437, 451-61 (1974). In this comment, the writer discusses at least
one possible remedy-the corporate agent. See id. at 453-57.
393. See id. at 459-61.
394. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of the law, any person may agree to pay,
and may pay pursuant to such an agreement, the same rate of interest as corporations
(other than non-profit corporations) on any loan in the principal amount of $500,000
or more, which is made for the purpose of interim financing for construction on real
property or financing or refinancing of improved real property, and such a loan shall
not be subject to the defense of usury unless it exceeds the maximum lawful interest
rate for corporations (other than non-profit corporations).
Id. This article was amended in 1979, and many of the questions raised in the text have been
clarified. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon). For a discussion of
the amended statute, see Roberts, The Revised Article 5069-1.07(b), 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 699
(1979).
395. For a possibly analogous interpretation of a construction loan, refer to the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code, § 9.313(a) (3), for a definition of a "construction mortgage" as
used in section 9. The pertinent part reads "a mortgage is a 'construction mortgage' to the
extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land
including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates." TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(a) (3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
396. Oxford, Usury Update, 15 REAL EST., PROS. & TR. LAw NEWSLETTER 35 (Oct. 1977).
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construction of such a building, (3) improved land which provides sufficient income to maintain the property and to retire the loans, and (4) land
to be improved in either (1), (2) or (3).111 The National Bank Act Regulations also provide a definition of improved land." Whether or not real
estate is improved has been left to the discretion of Texas courts in condemnation proceedings 3" and may also be left to their discretion under

article 5069-1.07. It has been noted that article 5069-1.07(b) is prospective
and may not be effective for loans made prior to September 1, 1975, or for
renewals of loans originally made prior to that date.4 "
Oil and Gas Exploration
Another new subsection of article 5069-1.07 has excepted loans exceeding
$500,000 for oil and gas exploration, development, and reworking of oil and
gas wells.' Questions in this area will arise with respect to certain definitions of terms used in the statute, such as "exploration," "development,"
"indirect costs," and "working interest."'0 2 Another relevant question is
how far beyond the wellhead phase financing can go under this subsection.,0
Other New Exceptions
Two other new sections, article 5069-1.08 and 1.09, have been added as
usury exceptions, but have not been construed by the courts.'10 Article
397. Id. at 36.
398. 12 C.F.R. § 7.2020(b) (1978).
399. Oxford, Usury Update, 15 REAL EST. PROB. & Ta. LAw NEWSOLErER 35, 37 (Oct.
1977); see Texas Power & Light v. Lovinggood, 389 S.W.2d 715, 717-18 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, no writ).
400. See Wallenstein & St. Claire, Property, Annual Survey on Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
28, 45-46 (1976).
401. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
(c) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, any person may agree to pay, and
may pay pursuant to such an agreement, the same rate of interest as corporations
(other than nonprofit corporations) on any loan in the principal amount of $500,000 or
more, which is made for the purpose of the payment of the direct or indirect costs of
exploration for oil and gas, the development of oil and gas properties, or the reworking
of oil or gas wells, provided that the value of the collateral securing such loans is
reasonably estimated by the lender at the time of the making of the loan to be in excess
of the amount of the loan. Such a loan shall not be subject to the defense of usury or
the penalties for usury unless the interest rate exceeds the maximum lawful interest
rate for corporations (other than nonprofit corporations).
Id.
402. See Oxford, Usury Update, 15 REAL EST., POB. & Ti. LAw NEwsuMwra 35, 39 (Oct.
1977).
403. Id. at 39.
404. See Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.08, .09 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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